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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
With respect-to the implied trust argument, the Court said first, that no
such trust existed, despite loose references in some New York cases to "trustees";
second, that even if such a trust existed, the corpus therefor would not only be less
than the total share left to the widow, but also would be so indefinite as to render
impossible of identification at the decedents death what property was subject to
the trust and therefore intended to be covered by the section.
Under the 1954 Code, section 2056 (b) (5), the problem in the principal
case is covered explicitly and the marital deduction is allowed when the surviving
spouse is given an uncontrolled power of invasion of corpus, exercisable either
by will or during life. This is true of a life estate, as well as of a formal trust. No
provision was added to make section 2056 retroactive, however, and the Courts
therefore have given it a prospective effect only, applying the 1954 Code, section
812 (e) to all decedents dying prior to December 17, 1954, the effective date of
the 1954 Code provision. The possibility that section 2056 might be viewed as a
clarification, rather than a modification of existent law, and therefore that its
rationale would be applied retroactively was denied unequivocally by the Tax
Court in Estate of Harrison P. Shedd v. Commissioner,sqpra.
In the absence of positive Congressional action to remedy this situation, it is
highly dubious that the trend of decisions, illustrated by the principal case and the
cases: preceding, will change. The possibility of receiving the marital deduction
for estates of this character is slight unless the estate can be placed exactly within
the narrow precise terms of the 1939 Code.
Richard G. Birmingham
Workmen's Compensation: Bar to an Action in Deceit
Employee, injured in the scope of his employment, failed to report his
injury to the Industrial Commission, relying on his employer's promise to do so.
Employer failed to make the report but paid weekly compensation to employee
for two years. When employer then stopped payments, the Industrial Commission
refised employee's subsequent application for workmen's compensation on the
grounds that the application was barred by the two year statute of limitations,
during which time either an application or notice of injury must be filed under
Ohio law, employee brought an action in deceit against his employer. Held:
Employer's compliance with the Workmen's Compensation law bars any other
action for damages for injuries arising in the scope of employment. Greenwalt v.
, 128 N. E. 2d 116 (1955).
0. S. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., In general, the Workmen's Compensation statute excludes all other remedies
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and liabilities with respect both to the employee and the employer, in regard to
damages for injuries received in the scope of employment. Connors v. SemetSolvay Co., 94 Misc. 405, 159 N. Y. Supp. 431 (Onondaga Special Term,
1916); State ex rel. Engle v.Industrial Commission, 142 0. S. 425, 52 N. E. 2d
743 (1944). Deceit belongs to that class of tort, recovery for which depends upon
a showing of actual damages. Castleman v.Stryker, 107 Or. 48, 213 Pac. 436
(1923). Since the damages for deceit are the same in the instant case as those
employee would have recovered under Workmen's Compensation (loss of wages
and medical expenses), and since the Workmen's Compensation statutes provide
that the employer will not be liable at law for damages for injuries arising in the
course of employment, it is difficult to sustain a case in deceit. Where the damages
charged are those which are covered by Workmen's Compensation and where the
employetr has complied with the law, it has been held that an action in deceit is
barred. Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 86 Ohio App. 525, 93 N. E.2d 33 (1949).
When an employer voluntarily makes compensation payments, the period
for filing a claim for compensation generally dates from the date of the last
payment. Marshall Field and Co. v. Ind. Comm., 305 Ill. 135, 137 N. E. 121
(1922); Delarm v.Malone Bronze Powder Works, 264 App. Div. 798, 34 N. Y. S.
2d 682 (3rd Dep't 1942). In many states this rule is written into the claim period
section of the statute itself; e.g., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §28:
"... No case in which an advance payment is made to an employee ...shall be
barred by the failure of the employee . .. to file a claim. . .". The theory is that
one who has been receiving a continuation of salary for a period of time cannot
be expected to have made a claim during that period. To do so would be an
admission that he is not fit for work, an admission which the employee is usually
not willing to make, nor is he expected to unless his employer refuses compensation.
Therefore, he should not be held to a very short period in which to make his
claim after the cessation of voluntary payments by his employer, and a fortiori
should not be denied the opportunity altogether. Morrison v. Ind.Acc. Commission, 29 Cal. App. 2d 528, 85 P. 2d 186 (1938).
Under section 1465-72(a) of the Ohio General Code, written application
must be made to the Industrial Commission of Ohio within two years after the
injury, or if the employer is a self-insurer direct written notice of the injury
must be given to the Commission, "or compensation . . .paid" (emphasis supplied) within two years of the injury. Under this statute an application to a selfinsuring employer has been held sufficient as against a later defense of failure to
file a claim or give notice within the statutory period. Tyler v.Rebic, 118 0. S.
522, 161 N. E.790 (1928). Also, it has been held that where an employee of a
self-insurer is injured during the course of his employment and orally communicates
to his employer the desire that application be made for compensation, such com-
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munication constitutes a proper application and the claim is not barred by the
section. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nelson, 50 Ohio App. 182, 197 N. E.
797 (1934).
It would thus appear that the employee should have appealed the rejection
of his application by the Ohio Industrial Commission. According to the majority
rule and the Ohio interpretation of its Code, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the last payment of compensation by the employer. Assuming
for the sake of argument that it does run from the date of injury, even in a
situation such as this, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nelson, supra, indicates that an
oral application or notification by the employee to his employer is sufficient to
satisfy the statutory requirements. The very fact that Workmen's Compensation
statutes for the most part provide that payment of compensation by the employer
suspends the statute of limitations until the date of the last payment is evidence
that a situation as presented by the instant case should not arise if the proper
procedural steps are taken.
Vincent Furlong

